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THE RESILIENCE OF LAW 
ed 
Joseph Vining 
One of the striking developments in academic law in the past half century is the 
reconception of law as one of the social sciences. The idea at work in this movement, 
as Joseph Vining says in this essay, is not that the law should use the findings of 
other disciplines for its own purposes and in its own way, but that in some deep way 
law itself-legal thinking, legal life-can and ought to proceed on the premises of 
social science, indeed of science itself This is in one seme obviously impossible: a sci-
entific rule is a prediction of future events based upon prior experience; a legal rule 
is the expression of a mind speaking to other minds-to other persom-seeking to 
affect their behavior by shaping their seme of the meaning as well as the come-
quences of what they do. Law works by an appeal from mind to mind. 
Yet in academic law, as in the culture more generally, the image of science as 
the paradigm of thought, including legal thought, has enormous presence and force. 
The inherent dehumanization of this kind of thought-the erasure of the human 
person, the voice, the mind, the elimination of human value and hope-threatens 
both law and democracy at their core. Vining's deep claim is that even in the face of 
these forces of dehumanization and trivialization law retains a life and vigor, a re-
silience, upon which we can found our hopes and seek to build. 
After my first year in law school and a summer at a New York law firm, 
which I loved, I was home for a bit before returning to my second year. It 
was 1962. My father, an economist who had studied under Frank Knight 
and Oskar Lange at Chicago in the 1940s, came into my room with the 
manuscript of a book he was working on. Its title was On Appraising the 
Pe,formance of an Economic System: What an Economic System Is, and the Norms 
Implied in Observers' Adverse Reactiom to the Outcome of Its Working. This was 
going to be my legacy, he said. If he did not finish it, he hoped I would. 
The book's argument was that an economic system was in fact a sys-
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tern of legislated rules, within the bounds of which economic actors made 
their decisions, responding of course to incentives and disincentives and 
others' actions under these conditions. It was a "mechanism," the behavior 
of which, in the sense of outcomes of its overall action over time, was to be 
described statistically. What the economist participating in the legislative 
process was to do was to determine and set out for legislators considering 
a change in a rule what the statistical consequence of the change would be, 
with respect to one or another parameter such as income inequality or em-
ployment in which legislators were interested because they were dis-
satisfied. For clarity he proposed a notation: "The modifiable operating 
mechanism, the thing for which economic system is the name ... , I shall de-
note by {0,S}." The S represented the collection of statistical mechanisms 
that depended upon the 0, and "the 0," he said, "is to represent a set of con-
straining and prescriptive rules," that part of the thing that is "directly" 
modifiable, a "system" of "statutory law and administrative rule."To be use-
ful or even relevant, economists were to start with the set of rules that 
could be so denoted by the abstract symbol 0. 
I read into the manuscript and eventually came to my father and said 
I could not help him. I could not help him because my sense of a "law'' or a 
. collection of "laws"was so very different. Law, I had already seen, was ex-
pressed in words spoken by responsible human beings to one another, who 
were listening to one another, and it was reexpressed and respoken over 
time. The meaning and effect of a "piece" of human law in the world, its 
very existence beyond the shadow existence a "dead letter" has, depended 
upon its authority, which came from constant mutual work with it. Laws 
might have systematic qualities but law was alive in a way rules that make a 
system are not. Law could die as well as live. There is a world of difference, 
I might have said if I had been older, between the authoritative and the au-
thoritarian. 
My father took the manuscript away. The problem I had was too cen-
tral, the difference between us unbridgeable. He published the book 
twenty years later,1 two years before I published The Authoritative and the 
Authoritarian, 2 and in one of those strange encounters of life, indeed as 
something of a sign of what has happened, his editor at Cambridge Uni-
versity Press came to where I was working, to head up the University of 
Michigan Press. 
The gulf between human law and rules that can be represented by an 
abstract symbol remains as large today. My father's work was a chapter in 
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the history of those who were involved in economics waking up to law, 
which was then in time followed by those in law waking up to economics. 
If they were academic lawyers-rather than practitioners, judges, or pros-
ecutors and attorneys general carrying on the everyday work of law-larger 
and larger numbers of them entered a period of trying to accede to the 
claims of economics upon our thought, and beyond economics, the claims 
of social science, and beyond social science, the claims of scientific 
thought generally. The last were claims to a total occupation of the mind 
that grew so much over this same period, connected, I think, to twentieth-
century experimentation with totalisms of various other kinds. 
James Buchanan, whose Calculus of Consent3 appeared in 1962, the 
same year as my conversation with my father, and who received the 1986 
Nobel Prize in Economics for "public choice theory," speaks of the "eco-
nomic theory of politics" involving "the extension of homo economicus to 
behavior under observed institutional rules." He treats my father's work as 
its precursor in several ways, principally in "initiating what was to become 
a centrally important component ... , the stress on rules as contrasted with 
the then universal stress on policy alternatives within rules."4 Like "public 
choice theory," "mechanism design theory" in current economics also has 
evident affinities with what On Appraising the Pe,formance of an Economic 
System was seeking to achieve in its focus on law.5 I do not think my father, 
in his work, participated in the elimination of public value and the melding 
of the premises of social science with those of natural science that is en-
capsulated in Buchanan's phrase homo economicus. My father's choosers and 
modifiers of rules legislatively or administratively still acted on behalf of a 
larger entity. But he was first of all a statistician. He repeatedly presented 
the true form of a rule as the rule of an ordinary game and was enamored 
of game theory which was then new.6 He was himself a "player," to use that 
term for a successful academic lawyer heard commonly in law schools 
now-he was devoted to football. He thought of mathematics as the ulti-
mately serious form of thought-hence the abstract symbol 0 precisely de-
noting the "set" of rules. While he might have demurred in life, he would 
have understood in his professional capacity how the geneticist and No-
belist Fran<;ois Jacob could say in his Logic of Life, published contempora-
neously with On Appraising the Performance of an Economic System, that there 
is "no longer a difference in nature between the living and the inanimate 
worlds," that "statistical analysis and the theory of probability have sup-
plied the rules for the logic of the whole world," and that "large numbers 
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are studied not so much because it is impossible to investigate the individ-
ual units, but mainly because their behavior is of no interest at all."7 
So, despite my father walking out of the room with his manuscript in 
1962, that manuscript was a legacy to me. The fundamental premises of its 
thought began to appear in academic law about the time I entered it. It 
was not just economics in the form celebrated by Buchanan's Nobel Prize. 
It was the turn toward social science more generally and, despite doubts 
going back to its beginning, the turn of social science to the natural sci-
ences. Into law-the most linguistic of disciplines, person speaking to per-
son, individuals listening and speaking on behalf of persons-was im-
ported the view that the discipline of law was a branch of social science. 
The American Academy of Arts and Sciences makes it such today, and aca-
demic lawyers post their online papers on the Social Science Research 
Network. 
The public treatment of human language in academic law reflects 
these developments in an important way. In 1961, Paul Freund, a name still 
known in constitutional law, gave a little talk to my first-year moot court 
club to introduce us to the world of law. He would say "a few things about 
words, and then a few words about things." His theme was the problem, for 
law, of writing dictionaries on the assumption that the difference between 
the "statistical" norm and the "normative" norm could be eliminated-the 
problem this presented for nuance in expression, the problem of the "im-
poverishment of language." Freund noted that law "lived by metaphor, ad-
vanced by simile." It "created," really, in its "overarching concepts." Speak-
ing of the development of number theory in mathematics, which he 
viewed as analogous but not the same, he said to us "the legal achievement 
is no less a grand and important thing." A generation later, in 2006, I lis-
tened to a younger colleague give a talk on a public occasion in which he 
implied everyone knew that "there was no sharp line between language and 
law." I inwardly nodded. Then he went on, "and no sharp line between lan-
guage and logic, or between logic and mathematics." 
This ultimate turn, to mathematics, indicates how far the fact we are 
speaking together can disappear from view. There are Vicos and Colling-
woods still arguing, and Alfred Marshall's introduction to The Principles of 
Economics is still there to be read,8 but social science cannot escape its con-
nection to the natural sciences and the premises or commitments of the 
natural scientist today. Most social scientists would not want to escape 
them. As the recent report of the quite representative commission setting 
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up the new Life Sciences Initiative at the University of Michigan ob-
served, 
Closely allied to the life sciences are the social sciences, which, 
though distinctive in their definition, are in fact concerned with a 
particular level of analysis in living organisms (usually humans). In-
deed the boundaries between neuroscience (a life science) and psy-
chology (a social science) are rather indistinct and are becoming in-
creasingly more so .... {T}he laws of physics and chemistry should, in 
principle, be able to explain and predict biological phenomena in a 
precise manner. Understanding these aspects of the life sciences in 
the terms of mathematical modeling and theoretical applications of 
universal laws and principles is one of our greatest challenges for the 
next century. 9 
In light of these premises of the natural scientist, so fruitful in explo-
ration of what we may call the world of force and its "mechanisms" -to use 
my father's word-finding a place for human purpose is an effort, to say the 
least. It is a long step from a working-day "methodological naturalism" to 
denying or to thinking one must deny the real existence of purpose even in 
the evening. But the step is taken, to an "ontological naturalism" declared 
and taught. A proper attention to the way things are, to which the devel-
opment of statistical techniques and analysis can contribute, is joined to a 
cosmic impossibility of an ought and the way things might be. We see all 
around how easily this happens. Then with the departure of purpose goes 
value, beyond "preference" which is the leaning of a system. And with the 
departure of value, the distinctively legal meaning of "norm" in "legal 
norm" is stripped away, as Paul Freund feared even in 1961. 
But purpose and value are everywhere in the discipline of law. They al-
ways have been, they are now, and they signal the first and immediate dif-
ference between law and social science, the nature of a "legal rule." Differ-
ent in the most basic way is what goes by the name "rule" in social science, 
what must be ultimately its character, from what goes by the name "rule" in 
law, this somewhat static form turning in the mind toward a more ener-
getic form in the domestic and international hope for the "rule of law." Of 
course it is a proper question and it is asked by lawyers themselves: why 
can't a "legal rule" become like a "rule" conceived within the terms of social 
science; why indeed is that not an ideal by the law's own lights, something 
graspable, predictable, "objectively'' existing apart from the intentions, 
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good faith, assent, and meaning of individuals and persons-like a rule of 
chess? Much of the answer, I think, is that life is not a game, despite what 
we all sometimes say about life. 
Life is not a game and law is not, however much contest is brought into 
law as a device in inquiry and reflection. Insofar as we are persons acting in 
positions that are not ours alone, that connect us to other individuals and 
that are defined by public value, there is an authenticity sought that is com-
pletely foreign to what we call "gaming." Games that are "play" are relief 
and time-out from life, which is serious, painful, often tragic, as real as can 
be. Sometimes we have to turn from the relief games give and, cliche 
though it is, say to ourselves, our friends, our children, "This is for real, not 
a game." Games can be good. They can be an entry into playfulness and its 
creativity. There may be an aesthetic experience in games, a dance in them. 
But games, as games, are empty, and their emptiness is a source of their re-
lief and pleasure, the unconflicted joy in the exercise of capacities that they 
allow. It makes no difference what the outcome is, really. The end of the 
gam~, as game, is only a prelude to the beginning of another. 
This difference in present character and ultimate ideal between legal 
rules and scientific rules is wrapped up with the centrality of authority in 
law, a phenomenon from which a social scientist would backpedal as if his 
or her very identity as scientist depended on distance from it. Listen to the 
distinguished contemporary neuroscientist Jean-Pierre Changeux, turning 
to the question whether the ordering of society might be "elevated" to the 
rank of a science. Changeaux speaks of the "task of devising precise rules 
of conduct," "the various prescriptions that regulate behavior at a given 
moment of the history of a society," that "entire set of rules of interactions 
among the individual members of a social group." He observes, as did the 
commission on the Life Sciences Initiative at Michigan which I quoted 
earlier, that ultimately those "precise rules," those "prescriptions that regu-
late behavior," "that entire set of rules of interaction," must be translatable 
into "hierarchical and parallel sets of neurons {that} contribute to the cog-
nitive functions that jointly construct a code of right action," and must be 
understood in terms of natural selection, not just as the grounding of work 
in biology, but as a total theory of the world. "Darwinian variations of so-
cial representations," Changeux says, working from the unstated premises 
of many today in his and in related fields-by "Darwinian variations," he 
means differences in "social representations" thrown up by chance on the 
model of genetic mutation-are "propagated from one brain to another, 
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selected at the level of the community, and finally retained in the minds of 
lawmakers."10 
What is critical in law is nowhere to be seen in this or any formulation 
like it, including that with which I began this essay-my father's "{ 0,S} ," "an 
operating, working modifiable mechanism ... the modifiable component 
of which is a system of constraining and prescriptive law and rule."11 Im-
plicit even in references to "precise rules of conduct" and "the entire set of 
rules of interactions among members of a social group," emanating from 
the neural structures of "lawmakers," is the order that might be given after 
someone says, "But that would be illegal," whether referring to taking a 
baby from her mother or drilling for oil in the Arctic wilderness; the order 
that might be given after saying, "Yes, that is legitimate," again whether re-
ferring to taking a baby from her mother or drilling for oil; 12 or, indeed, the 
order implicit in opinions issued through an appellate hierarchy on how to 
structure ongoing thinking and argument. Orders are implicit, but what is 
forgotten, and forgotten throughout discussion of law in social scientific 
terms translatable into basic science, is the correlative of an order, obedi-
ence.13 Never reached is why others out there obey, repeating the order in 
their own voice and words with their own sense of it, and implementing it 
or responding to it in good faith-not so much why they should obey, but 
why they do obey, pay attention, and continue to pay attention when there 
are so often so many reasons not to, when so much is at stake. What is for-
gotten, in short, is authority, the premise and the object of legal thinking, 
legal argument, and legal conclusion, kept untouched by modernity's chal-
lenges to authority elsewhere, and not only kept but expanded with ex-
panded claims for law, the "rule" of law, "law'' expanding around the 
world.14 
One reason for forgetting the presence of authority in law-and the 
inevitable issuing of orders and question of obedience-is the historical as-
sociation of the development of scientific and social scientific work with 
struggles for freedom of thought accompanying the political struggles of 
the last few centuries, freedom of thought that, in an ironic turn, total the-
orists in the sciences today are so strenuously trying to limit. But more ba-
sic in the forgetting is the erasure of the individual in scientific and social 
scientific thought, both the individual facing a claim of authority, listening 
and himself or herself judging while listening, and the individual contem-
plated and protected in and by law. Neither is the person really there in sci-
entific and social scientific thought, the individual person or the corporate 
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or institutional person, other than as a linguistic shorthand for a system. 
Nor is there living value that makes claims on us. Authority, person, value, 
individual - none are there, ultimately, in social science. All are there at the 
center of law. 
After the experience of the twentieth century, its struggles and its 
horrors, the erasure of the individual is the most glaring. Units of one kind 
or another of course figure in any professional thought and discussion. It is 
widely said today that as interacting units you and I are "adaptive systems." 
Someone using this term in professional scientific discourse would add, if 
pushed, "and nothing more," an addition critical to the difference between 
such professional thought and legal thought. Pictured in this way, a human 
being at any particular point in the course of life is a snapshot of the par-
ticular and changing outcome of two factors interacting over time: inter-
nal system and external system, nature and nurture, genetic endowment 
and environment. In 2007, journalists sought out expert commentary on 
why a man waiting for the subway with his two daughters leapt to press 
down between the tracks and save the life of a man who had suffered a 
seizure and fallen in front of an oncoming train. What was offered was that 
he had within him an "impulse" that was "followed spontaneously, either 
by virtue of genetic disposition or childhood/cultural training."15 These 
were the two sources of what this human unit was. 
But this is not the way we think about the individual-not me think-
ing, not you I imagine, not even those who speak in these terms. The word 
for the unique product of the action and interaction of the two factors, in-
ternal system and external system, is in fact not "individual" but "pheno-
type." The way we do think about the individual is reflected in law and le-
gal thought and includes something more than internal and external 
system, something "in" the individual-you, me, the scientist and social 
scientist too-which holds all of us back from vivisecting each other, 
which almost holds us back from torture. 16 That is something real in social 
scientists' minds and hearts and lives. It is real in law and legal thought, in 
which they themselves participate, not least when they are facing an order 
or asked to carry one out. Its reality, its presence, is alone enough to keep 
law from being a social science or ever becoming a social science.17 
It is almost embarrassing to make these points, they are so obvious, so 
unoriginal. Making them is like looking up and saying there is a sun in the 
sky. But they do need to be made, and made more explicitly than they have 
been. I have painted law as proceeding rather on its own, too important to 
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be affected at its core by what has happened in academic law over the last 
half century. But of course law has been affected. That is why it is better to 
think of law, with all it presupposes and makes real in human life and 
thought, as "resilient" rather than impervious. 
Particularly striking, I think, has been the attempt to fit the law of the 
central private institution of our time, the business corporation, to the 
premises of social science. Twentieth-century corporate law developed 
along lines analogous to the development of public administrative law, 
with the focus on the decision being made on behalf of the corporate 
body, and the questions being the authority of the decision maker, the en-
forcement of the decision if challenged, and the values and considerations 
procedural and substantive taken into account by the decision maker, or 
not taken into account. 18 In the 1970s and 1980s a push began to replace 
this analysis-which assumed that profit in a competitive market was the 
primary but not exclusive consideration if the corporation was a business 
corporation-with analysis on the assumption that the legal standard for 
decisions on behalf of business corporations was "maximization" of profit. 
The very notion of maximization was drawn from Western microeco-
nomic theory and from biology, where "maximization" describes what 
must be done to survive in evolutionary competition or competition in a 
"perfect market." In terms of the process of decision making, what began 
to be taught in law schools as well as business schools was that "business" 
thinking was supposed to be wholly calculating and manipulative, with no 
place in it for any genuine concern for effects on employees, retirees, the 
surrounding community, the nation, or the world. 
This push, coincident with the movement of James Buchanan's homo 
economicus into the academic picture of legislative drafting, administrative 
regulation, and judicial decision making, reached the American Law Insti-
tute in the 1980s and early 1990s. It was proposed that the institute state 
that the purpose of the business corporation should be "long-term maxi-
mization" of corporate profit and shareholder gain. This was rejected as a 
reading of the law, judicial or statutory. The reason was explicit, that it re-
ferred to "maximization" which, the council of the institute observed, 
would eliminate any authentic consideration of public value. In the insti-
tute's statement of what a "business purpose" was in corporate law, "maxi-
mization" of profit was replaced by "conduct of business activities with a 
view to enhancing" profit. 19 
But the teaching of maximization in its economic and biological sense 
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continued even after the Enron case laid bare just what was being taught. 
The response of the law, that in the "name" of which individuals speak, was 
to move during this same period to the application of the criminal law to 
the corporate entity itself-criminal law, in which the attitude toward 
public value described by "maximization" precisely fits the standard for-
mulation of what makes action or inaction criminal, the element of mens 
rea, the criminal mind. As an example, causing death (a fact) becomes mur-
der (a crime) as a result of "extreme indifference to the value of human 
life."20 That development in corporate criminality, state and federal, sub-
stantively and in sentencing, legislatively and administratively, reintroduces 
taking into account values for their own sake in decisions made on behalf 
of a business corporation. It has been fought in turn, and the struggle con-
tinues today. The struggle points up not only the effect of the effort to 
push economic premises into legal thought, but law's resilience: here it is 
living value, pushed out at one point, that can be seen reentering analysis at 
another point. 
On a larger canvas, there has been an attempt to introduce into legal 
thought generally a form of "cost-benefit" analysis that excludes all else, in 
line with the totalizing thought called "scientific" so frequently today. 
There is, as is said, "nothing sacred," nothing that is just not done, nothing 
that is not touched. It shows in the reopening of the question of torture. 21 
"What does that mean, 'outrages upon personal dignity'?" the U.S. presi-
dent asked in the struggle over the criminality of violations of the Geneva 
Conventions. "That's a statement that is wide open to interpretation," he 
continued. ''And what I am proposing is that there be clarity in the law so 
that our professionals will have no doubt that what they are doing is legal . 
. . . They don't want to be tried as war criminals. They don't want to break 
the law."22 What the president was reflecting is a view of law very much af-
fected by its identification with social science. There are large implica-
tions-this is one of them -of the absence there of person, purpose, value, 
individual, all folded into the term "human dignity'' found in the various 
conventions against inhumane treatment of human beings. Person, pur-
pose, value, individual are mocked, and not just in discussions of torture, as 
being vague, too "imprecise" to affect "rational" decision making-"ratio-
nal," of course, only in the sense defined by the deliberately limited presup-
positions of social science. 
It should not be overlooked that the current biological view of the liv-
ing world may well have grown out of economics, rather than the reverse. 
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The axiomatic hostility to what modern biology calls "vitalism" mirrors the 
cynicism -the moral stance-of a view of the human as intrinsically alone, 
ruthlessly self-seeking for a self that is axiomatically limited. The denial of 
the humane in the human is not everywhere in biology and economics, but 
it is prominent enough; and with and through these disciplines there has 
been imported into thought and discussion in law the dichotomy seen in 
both, between the "selfish" and the "altruistic,"with the selfish the undeni-
ably basic and with the altruistic an illusion eventually to be understood in 
a way consistent with the selfish. Not for nothing is the widespread popu-
larity in academic discussion of the "prisoner's dilemma." Its imagery, im-
prisonment and threat from others of pain or death, fits an underlying vi-
sion of what it is to be human-utterly alone in the world and knowing 
that one is utterly alone in the world. 
But again this is not the view of law, which over time has more and 
more protected the humane in the human. The individual contains the 
whole world, but is not alone. The individual is connected with others 
through participation in the life of living value, to which legal language 
makes constant reference, participation indeed in the creation of living 
value. As Alasdair MacIntyre has recently shown so well in his Dependent 
Rational Animals, 23 there is no such dichotomy of the selfish and altruistic 
in the real world, which is the world of law, where we are all dependent or 
disabled at some point in our lives, receiving from those whom we cannot 
repay and giving to those who cannot repay us, unpredictably and dispro-
portionately in both the giving and the receiving. In this connection too I 
might note as another example of law's resilience that the acknowledg-
ment of the full range of living value, which developed during the first 
three-quarters of the twentieth century in the law of standing and the very 
conception of who a legal person can be, still stands despite pressure on it 
from biological and economic thinking. The decoupling of the common 
law of judicial jurisdiction from "property" and "contract," the abandon-
ment of the so-called legal interest test of an earlier time, remains undis-
turbed by the presence of homo economicus in academic teaching and dis-
cussion. 24 
The attempt to challenge the absolute prohibition in law of the tor-
ture of human beings is emblematic, as is the attempt to reconceive the na-
ture of the legal persons we call business corporations. The language and 
the way of thinking shown in this challenge and this reconception are case 
studies in the implications of identifying law with social science. But there 
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is a canvas larger still that may include the question of torture. On it can be 
projected not only the implications of the pressure on law from this 
identification but law's resilience under this pressure: the pushing back, 
which the mind can feel, of the individual, the person, purpose, responsi-
bility, living value. 
Before us is a prospect of a kind different from the movement into law 
of biological thinking and such social scientific thinking that blends into 
it-economic, psychological, sociological, historicist. We are faced in law 
with the achievements of biological science within its own sphere and with 
developments in technology that permit manipulation in light of its 
achievements. The very real possibility now of the creation of forms of be-
ing that are hybrids of humans and animals, the circumvention of the 
breeding barrier that has heretofore identified an individual as of one or 
another kind, or species, raises the old question of slavery in a new context. 
And as Kazoo Ishiguro has explored quietly and effectively,25 the possibil-
ity of beings genetically engineered for organ donation also raises that old 
question of the association of property with human flesh. What is human, 
what is less than human, law and lawyers will be asked, what or who is an in-
dividual in the sense in which we speak of individuals in law, what or who 
is a person, what material forms of being human or almost human can be 
bought and sold and exploited, and, yes, treated as animal? In addition to 
this-the question of slavery-the genetic engineering of individuals, the 
possibility of human clones, and the selecting of embryos "in" or "out" in 
human reproductive technology all raise the eugenic question again in a 
twenty-first-century context. 
Slavery and eugenics-one would have thought the one was resolved 
by the late nineteenth century and the other by the mid-twentieth. The 
struggle with them is before us still. If anyone is dubious about the seri-
ousness of the conflict when biological and eugenic thinking come to the 
front of the legal mind, I suggest reading or reading again the Supreme 
Court's decision on race and slavery in Dred Scott, that creatures with traces 
of African blood in them could never reach a position of full human dig-
nity and responsibility. There were two dissents, with Justice McLean's dis-
sent pointing away from the biological and eugenic in a clear statement not 
so much of law as of law's difference, a statement of what law can compre-
hend that is simply not comprehensible within the framework being 
pressed upon it: ''A slave is not a mere chattel. He bears the impress of his 
Maker, and is amenable to the laws of God and man; and he is destined to 
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an endless existence. "26 Or read the Court's decision in Buck v. Bell on eu-
genics, that the poor, the less clever in calculating, the delinquent were less 
than fully human and should not contribute to the future material of the 
human form of being. This was the 1927 Court of Holmes, Stone, Bran-
deis, and Taft. There was one dissent without opinion.27 It may be notable 
that this sole dissent was by the only member of the Catholic Church on 
the Court,Justice Butler, who went to Mass every morning, and that the 
church's teaching was pointing by 1927 toward the universal human dignity 
latent in law's distinctive recognition of the individual.28 
Dred Scott was overruled by John Brown, Harriet Beecher Stowe, a war, 
and a century of internal legal development, but we are not certainly away 
from it yet. Buck v. Bell has been reviled but never overruled or repudiated. 
The questions of slavery and eugenics persist, as questions. How then can 
it be thought law will stay resilient under these pressures and in face of 
such enormous demands as these, when the very grounding of the human 
may be shifting underfoot? 
Law will stay resilient because the individual at home in law is the 
bedrock, prior to any discussion of history or process, or presently existing 
system, or scientific conclusion -in fact, prior to any discussion of "the in-
dividual." Though some individual waves his wand at us again and again, we 
are not changed from the individuals we are into products or statistical no-
tions. Beyond that bedrock-our actual presence to one another- I should 
say there is some assurance in the fact that law, with its presuppositions 
and, more than presupposition, its ontology, is the one thing other than 
food that we cannot do without. Social scientists, too, cannot do without it. 
Among the particulars that might be noted as we look forward, the 
worldwide development of human rights law,29 anticipated and perhaps in 
some way affected by the evidence of the lonely dissents in Dred Scott and 
Buck v. Bell, is founded on a vision of the individual and of the nature of 
value that social science cannot share, and insofar as domestic law is 
pressed by that mode of thought, international law can reach back and re-
call. Even while law in general was being identified in teaching and discus-
sion with social science in general, international law emerging from the 
revelatory horrors of "our" century was making implausible the 
identification of "legal rules" that live in human minds and speech with 
rules that can be conceived in the terms of social science. Indeed the de-
velopment of the web of international conventions on genocide, on tor-
ture, on human experimentation, on inhumane treatment, on behalf of 
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the disabled, on behalf of women and children has been loosening our own 
law from the positivism that began to affect it and thinking about it, at 
least in academic law, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, be-
fore the fifty years past that are our concern here. 
One of these international developments, proceeding from the mid-
century Nuremberg Trials, has been especially important in protecting the 
understanding of the human individual as something more than the prod-
uct of genetic and environmental systems. These are the legal limitations 
on experimentation on human individuals, that arena where the legal vi-
sion of the human being and the scientific and social scientific vision ex-
plicitly confront one another. Such experimentation in the United States 
had its own eugenic and authoritarian cast-its subjects disproportion-
ately children, the poor, the military, or those who had some forebears who 
had suffered slavery-and it was not pulled back substantially until the 
1970s and 1980s. 
I would add as important also the developing conception in law of the 
sentient beings we call animals, the other part of the hybrids I have men-
tioned. This development is another reason to believe that commitments 
to living value, to the individual, and to a dimension of reality that sustains 
and attracts what we might call law's eschatological thrust have been fun-
damentally unaffected. It too has its international side. Legally recognizing 
interests that are not proxies of human interests and acknowledging a 
shared sentience and special human responsibility for its protection has 
something of an a fortiori effect. In many ways the treatment of animals 
was the horror in the revelatory events of the twentieth century, as human 
beings were treated as animals so systematically and so cruelly, and when it 
comes to our own behavior toward each other we should eventually be able 
to exclaim, "Why, you would not do this to an animal!" Pulling the treat-
ment of animals toward the treatment or the "legitimate" treatment of hu-
man beings, rather than the treatment of human beings toward the treat-
ment of animals, is a working out of something within law, pushed not only 
by law's restlessness with incoherence but also by law's eschatological 
thrust, the pointing to a whole from the partial, which can be seen when-
ever the word "justice" is mentioned in the same breath as the word "law." 
In secular terms, that might be thought "Hegelian" or "Platonic," though 
Hegel had contempt for the American experiment, and there is the possi-
bility Plato might have. I prefer to think in terms of John N oonan's articu-
lation of the way an inner logic of a human institution works itself out over 
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long periods of time, on slavery, on torture, and on the ownership and ex-
ploitation of women and children.3° 
To be sure, whenever the border between human and animal is opened 
to any extent, there can be migration in both directions across it. Hearing 
the "cry of animals" as human cries are heard can reverse and can become 
hearing human cries as the cries of animals. An essay by a neurologist fea-
tured in the Chronicle of Higher Education a few years ago proposed that hu-
man language and literature "grow out of a biological system for attempt-
ing to fill needs," and the piece argued for "reuniting language with the 
screams and cries of animal communication, looking at it as a secretion of 
one of the spongiest organs in the body."31 But I think the movement 
across today's more porous border between human and animal is rather in 
the other direction, as the evolutionary biologist Simon Conway Morris 
has so eloquently argued.32 
Mention of a view of language as "a secretion of one of the spongiest 
organs in the body'' leads me to two final indications of the essential health 
of the legal mind. One is the growing sophistication about the nature of 
human language and its constitutive action in law. I was exposed to a pre-
cursor of it studying under Lon Fuller in the 1960s.33 But a full focus on the 
importance of language began at about the same time as the development 
of "public choice theory'' and similar schools of thought in economics and 
their movement in various ways into academic law. That full focus is the 
work of James Boyd White, in volume after volume.34 White has made 
clear that the sounds made by isolated competitors contending with one 
another, or the sounds made in advertising or political manipulation, are 
not the language of a person and not language with the force of law, but the 
sounds of force and force alone. I emphasize "alone" because they fit a vi-
sion of the human world, indeed the universe itself, in which there are ulti-
mately only forces (as Oliver Wendell Holmes once said). This is not the 
world of law. Because of White and his work, it can be said with confidence 
that when Steven Pinker or Herbert Simon and the disciplines with which 
they are associated speak of language, its origins, mechanisms, and mean-
ing, they are not talking about human language, or about the language of 
law, but about something else, in rather the same way that so many who set 
out to study the idea of God are not thinking about God, but about some-
thing else. 35 
There is, secondly, a new openness of mind among figures prominent 
in discussion of organized human life. The representative figure outside 
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law may be Jurgen Habermas, whose grappling with the issues raised by our 
new capacities for manipulation of the material substrate of the human has 
led him to acknowledge the sometime dependence of secular discussion 
on a dimension of reality that is not secular-in his words, "to the reason-
able attitude of keeping one's distance from religion without closing one's 
mind to the perspective it offers;' or "keeping a distance ... from a religious 
tradition whose normative substance we nevertheless feed on," or acknowl-
edging "moral feelings which only religious language has as yet been able to 
give a sufficiently differentiated expression."36 
This openness, which can be seen more widely in arriving at consensus 
at each stage in the expansion of universal human rights, is beginning to be 
matched within law by an increasingly explicit acknowledgment of an un-
interrupted ontological commitment in law to a dimension of reality that, 
whether or not it is or is called religious, has no place in scientific work or 
social science. Perhaps it can never have and should not have a place, given 
the power of the scientific method in understanding and possibly freeing 
us to some degree from the blind systems of the world with which and 
within which we live. The representative figure I would point to in this 
connection is Steven Douglas Smith, whose work and contributions to 
law's self-understanding have also been developing alongside the move-
ments with which I began.37 Habermas and those who work with his work, 
White and those who work with his, Smith and those who work with his, 
other examples from this volume-all these are not going to go away. If law 
and the legal mind were a rough tough animal, they are nourishing its 
bones and sinew. There is, both within law, even in academic law, and out-
side law, even in academic social science and social theory, increasing 
awareness that the human which the humanist insists is "all we have got" in-
cludes an open dimension to which there is really no limit. 
This should not be surprising. The world of the active mathematician 
is not accessible to many, even though the operation and application of 
mathematics may be. But it is a familiar thing to hear that mathematicians 
who call themselves realists acknowledge a dimension of reality that tran-
scends the here and now of our developing physical existence. They say-
and invite us to accept-that natural selection as a "theory of everything" 
does not reach and cannot explain mathematics, which is not, in itself, re-
ducible to the organization of neural tissue, but is real in a realm of its own. 
Lawyers and all those actively participating in law who are realistic about 
their thought and action acknowledge a dimension of human experience 
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of reality that is not at all the same as that of realist mathematicians but, 
like theirs, lies both beneath and beyond the realities admitted by the rules 
and presuppositions of the natural and social sciences. 
Law will be tough enough in the future. We can speculate why it has 
not been tougher in the past. There are tensions within law, as there are in 
your and my own thought, and there always have been. Identification of 
law with social science can have been an effort to escape them. Social sci-
ence and science behind it perhaps need not have pressed so. They might 
just have offered themselves, for there is a constant pull toward the author-
itarian, the meaningless, the automatic, away from responsibility, away 
from facing grief for what we ourselves do. Work in law even has an ele-
ment of the frightening in it, which must be handled in some way. Just as 
there is biblical awe, dread, and fear, so too can it be positively frightening 
to think that what is necessary to authenticity of any kind at any level-and 
necessary therefore to authority and therefore to law-runs straight up to 
a transcendent dimension of the universe. This is a problem the social sci-
entist of our time, thinking as a social scientist, does not have. But the 
lawyer does. 
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